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SUBJECTS OF SOVEREIGNTY: 
INDIGENEITY, THE REVENUE RULE, 
AND JURIDICS OF FAILED CONSENT 
AUDRA SIMPSON* 
I 
INTRODUCTION: SETTLER SOVEREIGNTY AND THE PROBLEM OF INDIGENEITY 
This article is an anthropological examination of the way in which 
indigeneity and sovereignty have been conflated with savagery, lawlessness, and 
“smuggling” in recent history. The national “problem” of indigenous smuggling 
is reconstructed here as it was portrayed in the public eye, largely via the media, 
and then through conflict-of-laws cases concerning the interpretation and 
applications of the “revenue rule.” Different understandings of sovereignty led 
to the “public problem” of smuggling. National laws outlawing smuggling 
implied that one view of sovereignty was more legitimate than others—that is, 
settler law over indigenous law. In the end, the smuggling problem was an index 
of the fragility of settlement itself, a fragility that was demonstrated repeatedly 
through the maintenance of legal boundaries and jurisdiction, the collection of 
taxes, and anxiety over whose law and whose jurisdictions should prevail when 
affronts to those boundaries had been made. 
This article concerns economic activities that express indigenous cultural 
and historical practice and that reflect a larger set of socio-economic conditions. 
The Canadian media framed smuggling as an abuse of a system of indigenous 
rights recognized under Canadian law and hence a problem for any recognition 
by the Canadian sovereign of indigenous sovereignty. The “problem” of 
smuggling was then constructed through the courts as wrongdoing by tobacco 
companies and as a question of how the United States, as a sovereignty, could 
assist Canada, as a sovereignty, thereby missing the larger, critical context of 
Iroquois1 trade practices and treaty interpretation across the borders of the 
United States and Canada, and the recognition of indigenous sovereignty. 
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     This Article is also available at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/lcp. 
      *Assistant Professor of Anthropology, Columbia University. Many of the sources cited in this 
article were obtained by the author from personal interviews with Mohawks from Kahnawake. LAW & 
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS was thus unable to independently verify this authority. Unless otherwise 
noted, these sources are on file with the author. 
 1. “The Iroquois” is a French transliteration of a word that refers to the Haudenosaunee, or 
“People of the Longhouse,” as they call themselves. This is a confederacy of six indigenous nations: 
Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga Seneca, and Tuscarora, that extended their dominion across what 
is now the northeastern United States and parts of Canada. They now reside on fifteen reservations and 
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II 
SMUGGLING AND ITS JURISDICTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 
The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) documentary, The Dark 
Side of Native Sovereignty,2 broadcast in 1996, subjected Mohawk trade and 
traffic to an intense form of scrutiny. Viewers saw indigenous protagonists in a 
bustling, underground cigarette trade justify their participation in trade through 
appeals in a system that had already constructed their activities as criminal or 
deviant. Through the television program’s appeal to tradition, to (special) 
rights, and to sovereignty, viewers saw the representations of these traders 
harden around the image of “smuggling.” This was achieved through a chain of 
conflations that removed the practice and its practitioners from a larger field of 
exchange in which it occurred, that of smuggling tobacco corporations. 
The role of “Big Tobacco” in illegal trade in cigarettes from Canada to the 
United States for eventual sale back into Canada culminated in a 2001 
Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) suit.3 This suit was 
filed by the government of Canada against R.J. Reynolds and others, a 
conglomeration of tobacco manufacturers, for conspiring to circumvent tax laws 
in Canada. 4 After Canada doubled its taxes on cigarettes in 1991, R.J. Reynolds 
sales declined significantly. The company then conspired to avoid paying 
Canadian taxes on cigarettes by exporting cigarettes manufactured in Canada—
and sometimes Puerto Rico—to the United States where they were then sold to 
distributors who transported the cigarettes back to Canada and placed them on 
the black market.5 It is asserted in the court decision that “[a]t least some of the 
smuggling was conducted by selling the Canadian cigarettes to residents of the 
St. Regis/Akwesasne Indian Reservation . . . on the New York–Canadian 
border.”6 The Akwesasne Mohawk reservation and other Iroquois reservations 
factored more centrally into this plan when Canadian cigarettes were exported 
to distributors who transported the cigarettes back into Canada through 
reservations in upstate New York.7 The cigarette-transport scheme also 
involved mail fraud and wire fraud.8 
Canada brought the RICO suit in the United States because many of the 
defendants and witnesses were based in the United States and because “much 
 
unrecognized, traditional communities and cities spanning the borders of the United States and 
Canada. 
 2. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation’s Witness television broadcast Aug. 20, 1996 (transcript on 
file with author). 
 3. Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 106–09. 
 6. Id. at 106. 
 7. Id. at 106–07. 
 8. Id. 
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of the alleged illegal activity took place there.”9 The Second Circuit determined 
that Canada could not use RICO statutes to recover lost tax revenues or costs 
associated with implementing their laws in U.S. courts10 because of the revenue 
rule, the common-law principle dating back to 1775 that one state will not 
enforce foreign tax judgments.11 
R.J. Reynolds is one of two primary decisions concerning lost revenue and 
the jurisdictional issues of sovereignty. United States v. Boots12 was not a 
conflict-of-laws or a revenue-rule case per se, but in it the First Circuit held that 
the United States’ enforcement of its own criminal prohibition of wire fraud13—
in this case, wire fraud with the intent to sell cigarettes in Canada—would 
amount to the enforcement of Canadian customs and tax laws.14 In Boots, three 
Mohawk defendants were charged with devising a scheme (1) to use wires in 
interstate commerce to defraud Canada and the province of Nova Scotia 
regarding duties and taxes, (2) to deprive the Passamaquoddy reservation of the 
services of their police chief, and (3) to travel interstate to facilitate bribery.15 
Like the Second Circuit in R.J. Reynolds, the First Circuit refused to implement 
Canadian laws, or rather, to collect taxes for Canada.16 In so doing, the court 
reinforced settler sovereignty—in an older, territorially based model—by not 
believing the argument that the defendants had been acting in good faith, based 
on their aboriginal right to trade, guaranteed to them by the Jay Treaty of 1794. 
Under the treaty, the defendants, as members of a “border tribe,” were legally 
allowed to trade across the border as long as their goods were intended for 
trade with another indigenous nation.17 
In spite of the larger system of exchanges that created the societal problem 
of “smuggling,” namely tobacco corporations willfully circumventing the tax 
laws of Canada, it was indigenous traffickers who received relentless public 
scrutiny, even when they barely appeared in the suit or the decision. The RICO 
lawsuit proved that there was something much larger at work in 1993 than 
indigenous trafficking in cigarettes: different claims to sovereignty. 
 
 9. Department of Justice Canada, Government of Canada Launches Legal Action in Major 
Tobacco Smuggling Operation, http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/news/nr/1999/doc_24494.html (last visited 
Jan. 23, 2008). 
 10. R.J. Reynolds, 268 F.3d at 131. 
 11. Id. at 108. 
 12. 80 F.3d 580 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 13. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1952). 
 14. Boots, 80 F.3d at 587. 
 15. Id. at 583–84. 
 16. Id. at 588–89. 
 17. Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation art. 3, Nov. 19, 1794, U.S.–Gr. Brit., 8 Stat. 116, 12 
Bevans 13. 
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III 
INDIGENOUS SOVEREIGNTY 
The rights and sovereignty of the Iroquois, or Haudenosaunee (“People of 
the Longhouse”), are ensconced in their long history as indigenous peoples in 
what is now North America. Their own governmental systems, political theory, 
and law (or Kaienerekowa, “Great Law of Peace”), as well as treaty- and trade 
practices in what is now northeastern and southeastern Canada, buttressed and 
continue to buttress their understandings of territory. In spite of their longevity 
in their space as caretakers and sovereigns, their history, narration, and practice 
of this sovereignty were refracted in the 1990s through the prism of bourgeois 
capitalism. Social perceptions were filtered through a new understanding of 
government as an entity that accumulated surplus and distributed income 
accordingly. To this effect, documentaries and courts portrayed “rights” in a 
manner that wedded them exclusively to capital accumulation. 
In the CBC’s documentary, Troubled Waters,18 which preceded The Dark 
Side of Sovereignty, an Iroquois interlocutor asked, “In today’s world, isn’t 
money sovereignty? In today’s world, isn’t money freedom?”19 His question 
provocatively summarizes distributive models of capital and social hierarchy 
and demonstrates that those relations of production may enable or disable 
modes of tolerance in neoliberal states. However, when the political subject is 
indigenous, citizenship takes on a temporal and economic form due to the 
societal expectation that Indians20 belong in a certain relationship to capital 
accumulation, that they be in another time (while simultaneously being within 
this world), and that they be poor.21 This provocation, like those of other 
speakers in this documentary, exposes that very expectation as well as the legal 
proscription that Indians’ bodies and their activities be contained on 
reservations. 
The historian Philip Deloria characterizes the structures of reservations, 
Indian agents, and the historical practices of state surveillance in these spaces as 
a form of societal expectation that still shapes social relations, as a historically 
 
 18. Canadian Broadcast Corporation’s Fifth Estate television broadcast, Sept. 28, 1993 (transcript 
on file with author). 
 19. Id. 
 20. This article is concerned with the sovereignty, trading activities, legal construction, and media 
representations of indigenous peoples in North America that have been understood at various times as 
“Savages,” “Natives,” “Aboriginals,” “Indians,” “Native Americans,” “First Nations” and various 
other, historically shifting categorical designations of their polities. Where possible their polities were 
identified with specificity, such as “Mohawks,” “Iroquois,” and in a manner that is consistent with their 
self-identification. For the purposes of clarity and in consistency with the colonial mapping of their 
bodies and their territories through law, the term “Indian” will be used, as this is the term that is 
deployed in the historical and mediated and legal “rights” literature on them. To be clear, this article is 
concerned with indigenous peoples of North America, and not the subcontinent of India. 
 21. Jessica Cattelino, Tribal Gaming and Indigenous Sovereignty, With Notes from Seminole 
Country, 46 AM. STUD. 193 (2005) (generally analyzing the forms of scrutiny that Seminoles are 
subjected to in American public culture because of the perceived incommensurability between wealth 
and indigenousness). 
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generated “colonial dream” in which “fixity, control, visibility, productivity, 
and, most importantly, docility” were realized.22 This dream was one of 
indigenous pacification, containment, and demobilization. In order to be 
actualized in the present, this dream requires that indigenous economic 
activities be watched, that there be a state-police presence in their community, 
and that Indians be passive in the face of this surveillance, regulation, scrutiny, 
and possible intervention. Consider here a response and a reflection on this 
expectation from a Mohawk named Kakwirakeron: 
Are you talking about Canada, the RCMP, invading a sovereign Mohawk territory 
and using full violent force on the Mohawk? If you’re talking about that, then they 
better think twice about that because the resistance here would be awesome. I think 
the people have really enjoyed prosperity for a long enough time and they have 
learned the lessons of Oka.23 
 The narrative of the documentary Troubled Waters is dramatized by fears 
of Indian lawlessness: 
Dust settles on the smuggling capital of Canada. Across the river, Loran Thompson is 
getting ready for another busy night. . . . Just across the river from Thompson’s dock is 
Cornwall Island, located on the Canadian half of Akwesasne. Mohawks don’t 
recognize the international border that cuts through the water. For them, it’s all Indian 
territory and smuggling is a dirty word here. They call it sovereignty. They maintain a 
treaty signed almost 200 years ago [that] gives Mohawks the right to trade freely 
among themselves.”24 
With this, the director de-historicizes the historical respatialization—or 
reconfiguring one’s understanding of a particular space—of Akwesasne through 
colonial boundary making. He renders this respatialization a simple matter of 
the refusal of Indians to recognize what is apparent, an international boundary 
that has been drawn through the water, which is in the minds of 
Akwesasnero:non (people of Akwesasne) their water. Noting that they are 
legally divested of the water that belongs to them according to their 
understanding of territorial ownership then operates as a critique of their 
understanding of the space that they occupy. This becomes their “refusal to 
recognize.”  If a refusal to recognize also involves using one’s territory in a 
manner that is historically and philosophically consistent with what one knows, 
then it is an incident of failed consent: Mohawks, in this case, refused to consent 
to colonial mappings and occupations of their territory. Such refusals, or 
failures to consent, require a legal response to contain the refusers, a move that 
then incites settler anxiety about the containabilty of Indian bodies and 
practices. That the territory and the people of Akwesasne cross four state and 
provincial boundaries and jurisdictions as well as an international boundary line 
bifurcating their territory,25 that this territory was divided without their explicit 
 
 22. PHILIP J. DELORIA, INDIANS IN UNEXPECTED PLACES 27 (2004). 
 23. Troubled Waters, supra note 18. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Akwesasne means “where the partridge drums.” LEWIS HENRY MORGAN, LEAGUE OF THE 
IROQUOIS 474 (1996). Akwesasne is a Mohawk reservation that is bifurcated by the international 
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consent, that their boundaries of this space are different than those mapped by 
relatively new nation-states and peoples, was not up for discussion or analysis. 
It is simply the Indians’ perceived misrecognition of boundaries (and the 
inability to contain their trafficking and their economic practice) that was the 
issue. 
Discourses such as these obscured the much larger economic imperative of 
tobacco corporations that relied on the actions and public utterances of 
Iroquois traders to hide Big Tobacco’s illegal trade activities. This reliance is 
revealed by the facts surrounding the protracted period of cigarette smuggling 
between 1989 to 2000 by Big Tobacco, as well as by later CBC attention,26 police 
investigation, and the R.J. Reynolds decision. Mohawks and other Iroquois 
transporters had a much smaller role in this “problem” than was represented in 
these early documentaries. Their relative insignificance was demonstrated in 
the R.J. Reynolds lawsuit and made public through the Canadian Department 
of Justice website, which stated, 
[T]he [members of the] Canadian Tobacco Manufacturers Council were also involved 
[and] were used to throw[ing] the Government of Canada off the smuggling trail. The 
government alleges RJR-Macdonald used the Council to blame organized crime while 
pretending it was trying to stop smuggling. At the same time it is alleged that RJR-
Macdonald was setting up a shell company in the United States to deceive 
investigators.27 
Yet the overemphasis on Indian activities was important in solidifying the 
fragile sovereignty of a settler nation-state—a sovereignty that, it will be seen, 
requires, along with taxation, the vanquishing, through law, of indigenous 
sovereignties. 
R.J. Reynolds appears unimportant relative to other revenue-rule cases such 
as United States v. Pasquantino,28 in which the Fourth Circuit found that 
brothers from Niagara Falls used wires in their bid to willfully defraud the 
Canadian government of revenue through liquor smuggled from Maryland into 
Canada. Pasquantino “diminished the rule of settler sovereignty” by extending 
the redress for harm done to Canada into a U.S. court. Nonetheless, all 
revenue-rule decisions act to retrench settler sovereignty over borders and to 
efface indigenous sovereignty and histories. The images described in these cases 
criminalized and spectacularized Iroquois traders, and Mohawks in particular, 
and in doing so obscured the means of the production and reproduction of Big 
Tobacco’s surplus. Disallowing the possible role of Indian political orders (for 
example, the legitimacy of the trading under the Jay Treaty) or of public 
argument about these issues, perpetuated the notion that there are actually only 
two legitimate political regimes in play—Canada and the United States. And 
 
boundary line between Canada and the United States and is also surrounded by, or lies within, New 
York State, Ontario, and Quebec. 
 26. The Smoke Ring (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation’s The Fifth Estate television broadcast, 
Jan. 20, 1998). 
 27. Government of Canada Launches, supra note 9. 
 28. 545 U.S. 1135 (2005). 
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the “extraterritoriality,” the cross-border question of the R.J. Reynolds case, 
which made the issue a choice-of-law matter, was simply a question of deciding, 
between the two countries, whose law would apply and which of these two 
unquestionably legitimate political regimes had incurred harm. 
Mohawk and other Iroquois traders had their sovereignty and sovereign 
right to trade repeatedly criminalized and effaced by analyzing the issues as a 
“smuggling” problem. Their aboriginal right to commerce across borders under 
the Jay Treaty was ignored, as Mohawks and other Iroquois were arrested 
repeatedly during the 1990s for smuggling and for conspiracy to smuggle 
contraband cigarettes across the border. Shortly thereafter, in 2001, the 
aboriginal right to trade would be denied by the Canadian Supreme Court.29 
Indigenous “smuggling” was a sign of failed consent to recognize territorial 
designations by third parties, of settler fragility. “Sovereignty” is articulated 
differently by Mohawks in their traditional trade practice, a practice that 
necessarily involves a grounded knowledge and deep critique of settler law and 
that is misperceived as criminal, even when it is an explicit expression of treaty 
rights guaranteed to the Mohawks as a border tribe. 
IV 
CHALLENGES TO SOVEREIGNTY:  
LOST REVENUES AND HISTORIES OF FAILED CONSENT 
A. The Problem of Lost Revenues 
In both Troubled Waters and The Dark Side of Native Sovereignty, “the 
problem” was revenue lost to Canada. Canada raised the tax on cigarettes to 
combat teen smoking in 1989 and then in 199130 and saw a rapid increase in 
smuggling. By 1994, Canada estimated that it had lost $2 billion (Canadian 
dollars) in revenue31 and consequently lowered the tax to combat smuggling. 
The public problem of cigarettes then morphed from a corporeal concern with 
the young citizen’s body to a public concern over the nation’s economy: 
“smugglers” were harming not only the former, but also the latter—the nation’s 
pocketbook. 
In R.J. Reynolds, one nation-state (Canada) acted as a person and filed a 
civil-action suit against an amalgamation of business interests within another 
nation-state. The suit was filed in the defendants’ own territory, within their 
own legal system, in order to sue for damages under RICO for injuries incurred 
in Canada. Canada argued that an amalgamation of U.S. and Canadian 
cigarette traders willfully circumvented Canadian taxation by smuggling 
 
 29. Mitchell v. M.N.R., 1 S.C.R. 911 (2001). 
 30. See Canada Border Services Agency, Summary of Allegations, http://www.cbsa-
asfc.gc.ca/media/release-communique/1999/0829ottawa-eng.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2008) (providing a 
chronology of cigarette taxation between 1989 and 1991). 
 31. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE TESTIMONY, CIGARETTE SMUGGLING: INFORMATION ON 
INTERSTATE AND U.S.-CANADIAN ACTIVITY 1 (2007) 
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contraband tobacco and cigarettes—via the Iroquois from reservation 
communities in the Northeast—from Canada, across the international boundary 
line for repackaging, and back into Canada, in order to evade Canadian 
taxation. In conspiring in these ways and in circumventing Canadian taxation, 
Canada argued, the tobacco company R.J. Reynolds and others “injured” 
Canadian property and caused additional damages and costs due to the 
necessity of investigation and legal proceedings. In ruling against Canada by 
upholding the revenue rule—which states that one country would not act as an 
enforcer of the other’s laws—the Second Circuit recognized the sovereign status 
of foreign nations. 
R.J. Reynolds offers an occasion for insight into the legal process of how 
“empire” is negotiated, where legal and political territories are acquired and 
new boundaries and political subjects are decided through the space of courts. 
In doing so, the terms—and the process—of political recognition are laid bare 
for analysis. This is a case in empire-building because its complicated legal 
reasoning both responds to and effaces, again, indigenous people’s claims of 
their “aboriginal” right to trade, upholds and reinforces the singular forms of 
sovereignty (even where distributions in capital deterritorialize sovereignty à la 
Hardt and Negri32), and disables the very possibility of indigenous participation 
in a contemporary trade network. In R.J. Reynolds, the possibility of a third 
legal system at work was not admitted into the analysis, thus solidifying settler 
sovereignty as normal, natural, and ultimately just. 
B. Histories of Failed Consent 
In contrast, Mohawks interviewed in the films spoke of an alternative 
mapping of territory. Consider this conversation on transport, place, and the 
law: 
Victor Malarek: “So these boxes move out every night and they’re headed for the 
Canadian side, but look what it says here—‘Not for sale in Canada.’ Where are they 
sold?” 
Loran Thompson: “Canuga Hogga territory, indigenous to the people of this 
country—the Americas.” 
Victor Malarek: “But they end up in Canada.” 
Loran Thompson: “Maybe to you they do, maybe to people like you they do, but to 
people like me, nationalists of my country and my government, that word Canada to 
me is Ganada—a village.” 
Victor Malarek: “When you see this, ‘Not for sale in Canada,’ . . . you’re not breaking 
the law?” 
Loran Thompson: “No.”33 
 
 32. See MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE (2000) (extensively analyzing this 
respatialiation of authority, sovereignty, and capital globally). 
 33. Troubled Waters, supra note 18. 
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Thompson’s arguments speak from Haudenosaunee legal and experiential 
history, a history that is punctuated by such exchanges and differential 
understandings of place and territory. Consider the history embedded in these 
remarks: 
You are a cunning People without Sincerity, and not to be trusted, for after making 
Professions of your Regard, and saying every thing favorable to us, you . . . tell us that 
our Country is within the lines of the States. This surprises us, for we had thought our 
Lands were our own, not within your Boundaries.34 
The white Man put that there, not us, I don’t know why we have to put up with this 
bullshit. 35
 
More than two hundred years separate these utterances, yet not much seems 
to have changed in the Iroquois perspective concerning the border. The central 
point of each lament, although inflected differently, remains the same: the 
perception of territory that underpins Iroquois people’s right to cross the 
border dividing the United States from Canada is radically different from that 
of either nation. These border utterances speak from the perception of the 
Northeast as a territory that belongs to the Iroquois, and as a place that was 
divided and is administered without their consent. 
These narratives speak as well to the political relationships that underpin 
this territory, and to the difficulty that Iroquois people have had and still have 
in moving through the landscape of the Northeast in a manner that is consistent 
with their self-perception—and rights—as indigenous nationals of that territory. 
Why is there such a radical difference between their self-perception and the 
ways in which Iroquois border-crossings are administered? Why is there such 
incommensurability between Iroquois’ perceptions of the treaty relationship 
and those of the regimes that now interpret it? What accounts, then, for the 
dissonance between Iroquois self-perception and state-perception? 
There are several factors at work in these disjunctions. The most significant 
are the different understandings of the proper relations that Iroquois and 
settlers have brought to their interactions through the past two hundred years. 
These different interpretations are brought to the fore in Mary Druke Becker’s 
important article on Iroquois sovereignty through time.36 Iroquois chiefs 
deployed the language of treaty—with concomitant notions of “father” when 
regarding the British—but did so insofar as these terms furthered their notion 
of the relation between the two as one of equals. 
Beginning in the late 1670[]s, the English and French began seeking territorial 
domination over larger and larger areas of land vis-[à]-vis one another. Each nation 
 
 34. Alan Taylor, Divided Ground: Upper Canada, New York, and the Iroquois Six Nations, 22 J. 
EARLY REP. 66 (2002). 
 35. This quote is provided by the author from her personal experience of overhearing one Mohawk 
man speaking to another over dinner about border issues, at a Red Lobster in Lachine, Quebec, during 
the late 1990s. See Audra Simpson, To the Reserve and Back Again: Kahnawake Mohawk Narratives 
of Self, Home and Nation 200 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, McGill University, August 2003) 
(providing greater discussion of this quote). 
 36. Mary Druke Becker, We Are an Independent Nation: A History of Iroquois Sovereignty, 46 
BUFF. L. REV. 981–99 (1998). 
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argued with the other that the Iroquois had agreed to become their children or 
subjects. The Iroquois had agreed to use the Iroquoain term for “father” when 
addressing Euro-Americans. This term was used because within the matrilineal 
Iroquois society a father was an indulgent, not an authoritarian, figure. The term was 
commonly used among Iroquois nations and by other Iroquois with whom they were 
in alliance. It implied a reciprocal relation in which care and aid were provided. It was 
not one which implied subordination.37 
These understandings of the Iroquois and by the Iroquois are common to 
the different positioning and perception of Indians generally through time, and 
to settler-state formation and asymmetries of power that allow one perception 
of difference to become institutionalized through law, policy, and other forms of 
state practice. Indian tribes were first perceived as nations (hence the model of 
international treaty-making which marks the earliest period of their interaction 
with the Dutch, French, and English regimes) and were then perceived to be 
dependant wards who required protection from white unscrupulousness on the 
frontier.38 Iroquois, in particular, have resisted their interpretive demotion in 
political affairs; yet, with the rise of the “welfare state,” many perceive Indians 
on the Canadian side of the border as clients (among many others) who need to 
be administered and managed. 
With this transformation of legal perception in mind, what then is the basis 
in law for Iroquois self-perception, sense of jurisdiction, and movement across 
the border? It is largely the nation-to-nation, or “linking arms,”39 metaphor of 
equality among people, reflective of the treaty relationship, that serves as an 
interpretive frame for Iroquois engagements with other nations, be they 
indigenous or nonindigenous.40 This is a notion anchored historically in 
arguments and deployments of the Two Row Wampum Treaty between the 
Iroquois and the Dutch,41 manifest in reminders and interactions that have been 
issued in serial engagements in the national and international arenas over the 
 
 37. Id. at 988–89 (internal citations omitted). 
 38. Id. at 982, 992. 
 39. The notion of “linking arms together” is more than mere imagery or a discursive device. It is 
the narrative of the League and reflected in the Hiawatha belt that represents the confederation of six 
nations. Becker extends this notion of linking arms together to the “covenant chain” agreed to between 
the Iroquois and the English, a chain of friendship that recognized and then elaborated alliances 
between nations for the purposes of trade. These are the understandings of friendship between equals 
that the Iroquois would bring to the treaty-making process itself. Id. at 985–56; see also ROBERT 
WILLIAMS, LINKING ARMS TOGETHER: AMERICAN INDIAN VISIONS OF TREATY AND PEACE (1999) 
(providing a book-length treatment of the interpretive space of treaty). 
 40. Cf. Becker, supra note 36. 
 41. The Two-Row Wampum Treaty is a treaty of coexistence between the Dutch and Iroquois 
represented by a belt of purple and white wampum shells. There are rows of purple wampum parallel 
to each other, with white wampum between and around them. The white represents the sea of life that 
each row metaphorically shares. One purple row represents an Iroquois vessel and the other a 
European vessel. Although they share the same sea, they are separate and parallel; they should not 
touch or disturb each other or try to steer the other’s vessel even though they share the same space. 
Between the vessels are chains that connect them to each other; these are to be shined and maintained 
by one or the other vessel. 
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past three centuries. But the most important among these treaties for cross-
border articulations is the Jay Treaty of 1794.42 
In 1794, the United States and Great Britain signed the Treaty of Amity, 
Commerce, and Navigation, commonly known as the Jay Treaty.43 The U.S.–
British boundary had been established in 1783 with the Treaty of Paris, and, as 
a creature of the post–Revolutionary War landscape, the Jay Treaty then 
sought to delimit and establish jurisdiction along the Treaty of Paris boundaries 
and to harmonize trade between the countries.44 In a concession to Indian 
nations along those boundaries, the Jay Treaty acknowledged and, as in the 
case of all early colonial legislation, codified within a particular time and 
space—and with concomitant attitudes and flows of power—the rights of Indian 
nations occupying areas near the U.S.–Canadian border, among them the 
Iroquois Confederacy nations—the Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, 
Seneca, and Tuscarora. 
In the Jay Treaty, the right to traverse the boundaries of the U.S.–British 
divide freely and without levy was guaranteed for Indian people who were 
operating in what has been defined as their cultural traditional “nexus” of 
trade.45 This is laid out explicitly in Article III of the Jay Treaty: 
It is agreed that it shall at all Times be free to His Majesty’s Subjects, and to the 
Citizens of the United States, and also to the Indians dwelling on either side of the 
said Boundary Line, freely to pass and repass by Land or Inland Navigation, into the 
respective Territories and Countries of the Two Parties on the Continent of 
America. . . . 
No Duty of Entry shall ever be levied by either Party on Peltries brought by Land, or 
Inland Navigation into the said Territories respectively, nor shall the Indians passing 
 
 42. Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, Nov. 19, 1794, U.S.–Gr. Brit., 8 Stat. 116, 12 
Bevans 13. 
 43. Id. 
 44. For example, Francis M. Carroll quotes the Northeast boundary as the following “From the 
NorthWest Angle of Nova Scotia, vs. That Angle which is formed by a Line drawn due North from the 
Source of the Saint Croix River to the Highlands along the said Highlands which divide those Rivers 
that empty themselves in to the River St. Lawrence, from those which fall into the Atlantic Ocean, to 
the Northwestern-most head to the Connecticut River.”  He goes on to describe the ambiguities that 
attend to these descriptions, that these geographic features were not commonly known by all and that 
the boundaries remained into the 1800s with the Treaty of Ghent in 1815, providing for boundary 
commissions to survey and decide on the matter further. See Francis M. Carroll, Kings and Crises: 
Arbitrating the Canadian-American Boundary Dispute and the Belgian Crises of 1830–31, 73 NEW ENG. 
QUART. 179, 181–82 (2000). This rendering of space and place which privileges boundaries over sites is 
critical to the disembodiment of territories from Indian grasp. A full discussion of the failures of 
cartography as a site-specific process and the implications of this for nation-formation lies well beyond 
the horizon of this article; however, for an excellent discussion of this with reference to the predicament 
of Samuel Champlain’s explorations in the St. Lawrence, see Kathleen Kirby, Re-Mapping Subjectivity: 
Cartographic Vision and the Limits of Politics, in BODYSPACE: DESTABILIZING GEOGRAPHIES OF 
GENDER AND SEXUALITY 45 (Nancy Duncan ed., 1996). 
 45. Bryan Nickels, Native American Free Passage Rights Under the Jay Treaty: Survival Under 
United States Statutory Law and Canadian Common Law, 24 BRIT. COLUM. INT’L & COMMON L. REV. 
315 (2001) (“However, to claim the free passage right in Canada, a U.S. Indian has to demonstrate a 
cultural or historical “nexus” to the specific area in Canada he wishes to visit.”). 
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or repassing with their own proper Goods and Effects of whatever nature, pay for the 
same any Impost or Duty whatever.46 
This explicit right to pass, then, implicitly leaves the legal regimes of Canada 
and the United States with the power to define who those Indian nations are 
and how that right to pass shall be rendered and respected. As well, and very 
critically, the regimes of the United States and Canada were bequeathed the 
power to choose whom they would recognize as members of these communities. 
It is prudent now to map out how these longstanding forms of recognition then 
speak to local forms of recognition, and more critically, how they speak to 
indigenous notions of citizenship-formation and territory. Connecting these 
discourses illuminates how legal interests and designations not only affect the 
possibility of movement, but how these interests also work to define, through 
identification practices, their own territory and boundaries.47 Such connections 
may illuminate as well how these identifications and legal and interpretive acts 
are reformulated in practice and how they are not only “resisted,” but 
circumvented, denied, or ignored. 
V 
BRUSHING UP AGAINST THE STATE:  
TRANSHISTORIC NARRATIVES OF HOME AND OF TREATY 
What follows are ethnographic fragments of contemporary Mohawk 
interpretations of their sovereignty rights as they cross and recross the 
international boundary line in the Northeast. The legal history that informs 
their understanding of sovereignty comprises the rest of this section. 
I was coming back [to Kahnawake] and after a four hour drive. I was daydreaming. 
When the border guard asked me first where I was from I said “Kahnawake.” He was 
puzzled; he then asked where do you live and who owns my car because of my New 
York plates. . . . I said “I live in Albany,” and “I own the car” then he asked why I was 
going to Kahnawake. . . . I said I was going HOME, then he said “why do you live in 
Albany[.]” I said that is where I work and that is where I live, and I also live in 
Kahnawake. He said I can’t live in two places and I told him I can live in as many 
places as I want!48 
When asked to declare his citizenship, Pronovost replied that he was from 
Kahnawake, was a North American Indian and a member of the Iroquois 
Confederacy. At the time, having neither a Confederacy issued “Red Card” nor a 
Canadian-issued Indian Status Card, Pronovost was told he had to go to Albany to 
produce an identification card verifying that he had [fifty] percent blood quantum.49 
 
 46. Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation art. 3, Nov. 19, 1794, U.S.–Gr. Brit., 8 Stat. 116, 12 
Bevans 13. 
 47. Cf. JOHN TORPEY, THE INVENTION OF THE PASSPORT: SURVEILLANCE CITIZENSHIP AND 
THE STATE (2000). 
 48. This quote is provided by the author from her interview with a thirty-eight-year-old Mohawk 
man from Kahnawake while researching Mohawk nationhood and citizenship. See Simpson, supra note 
35 (providing greater discussion of this quote). 
 49. Ross Montour, US Tax Court Declares “No Jurisdiction” Over Kahnawake Resident, 
http://www.easterndoor.com/archives/12-20/12-20.htm#stb (last visited Apr. 4, 2008). Louis Pronovost is 
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I was flying back to New York and this guy at the airport wanted to know my blood 
quantum. I said 100%. He said, “do you have a green card?” I said “I don’t need 
one[;] I am a North American Indian.” He asked for proof of my blood quantum. I 
said, “[L]ook at my Indian card,50 I am an Indian that is why I have one.” He made me 
go to INS [the Immigration and Naturalization Service] . . . the next day in New York 
City, and I was really mad but I went. This is the first time this happened to me in all 
these years. I went there and the guy said “you are an Indian you don’t belong here, I 
am closing this case.” I knew I didn’t belong there. I went to the lawyer at the 
American Indian Community House the next day and I got a copy of the Jay Treaty. 
Now I carry that and my Indian card with me whenever I cross.51 
The Jay Treaty got its first test of indigenous mobility and citizenship with 
the case of United States ex rel Diabo v. McCandless52 in 1927.53 With the passage 
of the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924,54 Indians in the United States were made 
citizens of the United States,55 and those in Canada who travelled and worked 
within the United States were rendered “aliens.” Although the Citizenship Act 
may have been regarded by some First Nations and Native Americans in the 
United States as an affirmation of their equal place within the United States, 
the Act was regarded by other highly independent, self-ruling communities, 
such as Hopi, Onondaga, and Akwesasne, as the imposition of a foreign form of 
citizenship and governance.56 Citizenship criteria determined by the Act omitted 
Canadian forms of recognition that afforded rights to Indians in Canada. 
Nonetheless, because Iroquois on both sides of the border had histories of 
crossing the border57 and knew that this passage was a right recognized by the 
Jay Treaty, they believed that they had a right to pass through the Canadian–
U.S. border as indigenous nationals rather than as “aliens.” 
 
a Kahnawake resident who argued in this taxation case that he was a Mohawk citizen and not a U.S. or 
Canadian citizen for taxation purposes. 
 50. Indian status cards are sometimes referred to in everyday speech of community members as 
“Indian cards.” 
 51. This quote is provided by the author from her interview with a sixty-eight-year-old Mohawk 
man. See Simpson, supra note 35 (providing greater discussion of this quote). 
 52. 18 F.2d 282 (E.D. Pa. 1927). 
 53. See Gerald. F. Reid, Illegal Alien? The Immigration Case of Mohawk Ironworker Paul K. 
Diabo, 151 PROC. OF THE AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 61–78 (2007) (offering a recent historical reconstruction of 
this event). 
 54. 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (1924). 
 55. For a discussion of the effects of this Act on the sovereignty of Native American nations in the 
United States and, in particular, for his discussion of the resistances against this Act by Iroquois and 
other peoples, see Robert Porter, The Demise of the Ongwehonweh and the Rise of the Native 
Americans: Redressing the Genocidal Act of Forcing Citizenship Upon Indigenous Peoples, 15 HARV. 
BLACKLETTER L.J. 107–83 (1999). 
 56. For a perspective on Mohawk citizenship, sovereignty and borders from Akwesasne, see 
Michael Mitchell, Akwesasne: An Unbroken Chain of Sovereignty, in DRUMBEAT: ANGER AND 
RENEWAL IN INDIAN COUNTRY 105–36 (1988). For a treatment of the perspective of Native 
Americans generally, see VINE DELORIA, BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES 18–19 (1974); 
Eileen M. Luna-Firebaugh, The Border Crossed Us: Border Crossing Issues of the Indigenous Peoples 
of the Americas, WICAZO SA REV. 159 (2002); Alexandra Witken, To Silence a Drum: the Imposition of 
United States Citizenship on Native Peoples, 21 HISTORICAL REFLECTIONS 353, 379 (1994). For a 
discussion of the Iroquois perspective, see Porter, supra note 55, at 127, 159–61. 
 57. See BETH LADOW, THE MEDICINE LINE: LIFE AND DEATH ON NORTH AMERICAN 
BORDERLAND (2001) (detailing the history of the U.S.–Canadian border from the Gros-Ventre, 
Blackfoot, and Settler vantage points). 
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Diabo was, by all legal reports, one hundred percent Iroquois, indigenous, 
and not, therefore, an “alien,”58 except, of course, under the terms of the 
Citizenship Act. More specifically, he was a Mohawk ironworker from 
Kahnawake who traveled down to the United States to work, as did many other 
men from the community. He had worked on and off in the United States for 
ten years and had both passed through the border and worked in the United 
States with no difficulty. Yet he suddenly found himself arrested and deported 
in 1925 as an illegal alien. Diabo petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus on the 
ground that, as a member of a North American Indian tribe, he was exempt 
from immigration laws as guaranteed under Article III of the Jay Treaty. The 
United States District Court for the Eastern District concurred and held that 
the right to cross the border was in fact an aboriginal right, a right that was 
inherent—one recognized and confirmed (not created) by the treaty:59 
[T]he rights of the Indians are [not] in any way affected by the treaty, whether now 
existent or not. The reference to them was merely the recognition of their right, which 
was wholly unaffected by the treaty, except that the contracting parties agreed with 
each other that each would recognize it. . . . From the Indian view point, he crosses no 
boundary line. For him this does not exist.60 
The court’s decision was confirmation throughout Iroquois country that 
Iroquois rights were legally recognized, affirmed, and active, in spite of the 
major setback that the Citizenship Act posed for the particular form of 
recognition that they desired—that of sovereign nations. 
Both the Citizenship Act and the Johnson-Reed Immigration Act of 1924, 
which included exclusionist measures against both Native Americans and 
Asians, were especially onerous for the Iroquois because they represented the 
twin imposition of alien status with its difficulties for Iroquois travelers and 
workers from Canada and of foreign citizenship with its links to foreign-
governance structure. These laws, as well as band-council governance61 were 
resisted in Iroquois communities on both sides of the border, since any form of 
foreign citizenship meant the dissolution of traditional governance and 
membership and the growing power of the settler state within Iroquois 
communities. 
 
 58. Diabo v. McCandless, 18 F.2d 282, 283 (E.D. Pa. 1927). 
 59. Id.; Sharon O’Brien, The Medicine Line: A Border Dividing Tribal Sovereignty, Economies and 
Families, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 315 (1984). 
 60. Diabo, 18 F.2d at 283 (emphasis added). 
 61. Band Councils are the administrative governments authorized by the government of Canada on 
Indian reserves to administer The Indian Act, “[a]n Act respecting Indians.” The Indian Act is an 
overarching piece of legislation enacted by the Parliament of Canada in 1876 that recognizes certain 
indigenous peoples in Canada as “status” Indians who then have rights and provisions based on this 
recognition as legal wards of the state. Band Councils supplant indigenous forms of governance and 
have been vigorously contested for this. John Tobias argues that the Act was conceived to “protect, 
civilize and assimilate” Indians in Canada. It also laid the foundation for all further legislation 
regarding the lives of Indians which were in the cases of Western Indians and others, rejected. John 
Tobias, Protection, Civilizaton and Assimilation, in SWEET PROMISES: A READER IN INDIAN-WHITE 
RELATIONS 132–33 (J. R. Miller ed., 1991). 
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These resistances to, and struggles with, state forms were not limited to a 
few periods and places—they had also been felt in Kahnawake in 1884, with 
petitions against the Canadian Indian Advancement Act of 1884;62 in 
Akwesasne in 1899, when the traditional chief Jake Fire was shot and killed by 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police for demanding their removal from the 
community in respect for traditional Mohawk governance;63 then at Six Nations, 
for the imposition of an electoral band council in 1924; and the American side 
of Akwesasne in 1924, with the United States’ Indian Citizenship Act.64 
The Indian Defense League of America (IDLA) was formed at Tuscarora in 
1926 by Clinton Rickard specifically to address the cross-border rights of 
Iroquois peoples.65 
The IDLA was inspired by the work of the Deskaheh66 (Levi General) at Six 
Nations and embodied the effort to assert Iroquois sovereignty and to affirm 
Iroquois treaty rights. Deskaheh worked tirelessly to get Six Nations recognized 
as a member nation within the League of Nations. But, in 1924, Canada began 
to forcefully enforce its Indian Act of 1876 (whose imposition at Six Nations 
was avoided because of the Indians’ “civilized status” relative to other Indians), 
supplanting the traditional chiefs and band-council forms of governance in his 
community,67 and seizing the wampum belts.68 When Deskaheh’s struggle to gain 
international recognition failed, he made a radio address explaining the 
Iroquois position vis-à-vis land and sovereignty, exhorting Americans to “know 
their history” and argued for an understanding of citizenship as a colonizing 
technique. Of this he argued, 
Your governments have lately resorted to new practices in their Indian policies. In the 
old days, they often bribed our chiefs to sign treaties to get our lands. Now they know 
that our remaining territory can easily be gotten from us by first taking our political 
rights away in forcing us into your citizenship, so they give jobs in their Indian offices 
 
 62. The Indian Advancement Act of 1884 replaced traditional governments with electoral systems 
understood as “band councils” on reservations. GERALD F. REID, KAHNÀWAKE: FACTIONALISM, 
TRADITIONALISM, AND NATIONALISM IN A MOHAWK COMMUNITY, LINCOLN: NEBRASKA 70 (2004). 
 63. Mitchell, supra note 56, at 118. 
 64. The Indian Citizenship Act (Snyder Act) of 1924 granted citizenship to all Indians in the 
United States and was signed into law by President Calvin Coolidge on June 2nd of that year. 
 65. JOLENE RICKARD, THE INDIAN DEFENSE LEAGUE OF AMERICA 48 (1995). 
 66. “Deskaheh” is a hereditary chief of the Iroquois Confederacy. Levi General was a Cayuga 
from Six Nations who occupied the title of Deskaheh until his death. 
 67. Deskaheh, Levi General, An Iroquois Patriot’s Fight for International Recognition, in BASIC 
CALL TO CONSCIOUSNESS 41–47 (Akwesasne Notes, ed. 2005). 
 68. Wampum belts are belts that are representations of law and agreements between parties that 
are made from wampum shell, a form of valued shell and in some cases, currency used by Indians and 
settlers in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. These belts are the authoritative basis for 
governance and treaty for some Indigenous people in the Northeast, and especially the Iroquois (for a 
brief history of wampum belts and Iroquois generally, see TEHANETORENS, WAMPUM BELTS 
OHSWEKEN 47–48 (1983). The Royal Canadian Mounted Police forcefully “seized the wampum [belts] 
used to sanction council proceedings and other council records,” and the traditional government in 
place at Six Nations was forcibly disbanded. Sally M. Weaver, The Iroquois: The Grand River Reserve 
in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, 1875-1945, in ABORIGINAL ONTARIO: 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE FIRST NATIONS 248 (Edward S. Rogers & Donald B. Smith, eds. 
1994). 
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to the bright young people among us who will take them and who, to earn their pay, 
say that your people wish to become citizens with you and that we are ready to have 
our tribal life destroyed and want your governments to do it. But that is not true.69 
He died days later in the home of Clinton Rickard on the American side of 
the border on the Tuscarora Indian Reservation. The circumstances of his death 
were symbolic of his struggle and for the struggle of Iroquois peoples at the 
time: he died on the Tuscarora reservation, exhausted and sick from the 
struggle in Geneva and with the medicine being delivered to him from Six 
Nations unable make it across the border because of immigration restrictions.70 
His final words were to “fight for the line,” meaning fight for the border and 
Iroquois people’s right to cross.71 
In the fifty years following Deskaheh’s death, the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, the courts, and the border guards variously interpreted 
Jay Treaty rights and applied law to indigenous and nonindigenous peoples who 
crossed the border. Citizenship Act interpretations were at times in direct 
confrontation with Canadian forms of recognition. In 1933, Canada adopted 
more political forms of recognition at the border, with its own terms of Indian 
admissibility. These forms of recognition in Canada confounded border guards 
as they dealt with individuals that were non-Indian and had Indian status 
conferred  upon them by the Canadian state, such as non-Indian women who 
married Indian men; they likewise applied a separate set of rules for Indian 
women who married non-Indian men. In a series of interesting situations, 
predicaments, and decisions, border guards and the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service then had to stretch immigration law and the Jay Treaty 
to deal with white women who had Indian cards and wanted to cross;72 Indian 
women who did not have Indian status in Canada and wanted to stay within the 
United States;73 and in one the of the earliest test cases of the Jay Treaty, with 
two nonindigenous Canadians.74 
 
 69. Deskaheh, Levi General, The Last Speech of Deskaheh, in BASIC CALL TO CONSCIOUSNESS 
48–54 (Akwesasne Notes, ed. 2005). 
 70. RICKARD, supra note 65, at 48. 
 71. Id. at 51. 
 72. For historical and personalized accounts of these struggles during and before the amendment 
to the Act, see generally Janet Silman, ENOUGH IS ENOUGH: ABORIGINAL WOMEN SPEAK OUT 
(1994); Lynn Gehl, “The Queen and I”: Discrimination in the Indian Act Continues, in CANADIAN 
WOMAN STUDIES 64–69 (2000).   
 73. Goodwin v. Karnuth, 74 F. Supp. 660 (W.D.N.Y. 1947). 
 74. Karnuth v. United States, 279 U.S. 231, 233 (1929) (stating that, while Antonio Danelon and 
Mary Cook both lived on the Canadian side of the border of Niagara Falls, “[n]either . . . [was] a native 
of Canada.”) 
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VI 
BORDERS OF BLOOD 
With the passage in 1934 of the Indian Reorganization Act, blood became a 
legal marker of Indian identity in the United States at the federal level75 and the 
INS determined that the amount of Indian blood that Indians from Canada had 
to possess was fifty percent in order to gain passage into the United States.76 At 
the border, this requisite was largely ignored in favor of more political forms of 
recognition, in line with Canadian practice. This persisted until the case of 
Goodwin v. Karnuth in 1947. 
Dorothy Karnuth was a full-blooded Upper Cayuga from the Six Nations 
Reserve near Brantford, Ontario, who was disenfranchised from her Indian 
status due to her marriage to a white man:77 she did not have the political 
recognition that was necessary for her to remain in the United States, according 
to immigration practices. In her case the courts gave the concept of Indians 
born in Canada a racial connotation. The INS soon revised its immigration 
manual: 
The words “American Indians born in Canada” . . . must be given a racial connotation. 
Thus an alien born in Canada who is of American Indian race is entitled to the 
immunities of this section regardless of membership in an Indian tribe or political 
status under Canadian law.78 
This blood-quantum requirement was hardened into INS policy in 1952 with 
the Revised Citizenship Act of that year and then upheld in Akins v. Saxbe.79  
The blood-quantum requirement was not consistent with Canadian forms of 
recognition, forms that were based on the preexisting and somewhat sanguine 
model of the Victorian bourgeois family, but it was clearly consistent with the 
racialization of identity that had long been occurring in the States and was 
hardening around issues of immigration.80 
 
 75. The Indian Reorganization Act (Wheeler–Howard Act) was enacted in Congress on June 18, 
1934. Section 19 defines “Indian” in three terms, the final term being related to blood quantum: “The 
term ‘Indian’ as used in this Act shall include all persons of Indian descent who are members of any 
recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction, and all person[s] who are descendants of such 
members who were, on June 1, 1934, residing within the present boundaries of any reservation, and 
shall further include all other persons of one-half or more Indian blood.” 
 76. 48 U.S.C. § 206 (1934). 
 77. She was disenfranchised according to the Indian Act of Canada, which stated, “[a]ny Indian 
woman who marries any person other than an Indian, or a non-treaty Indian, shall cease to be an 
Indian within the meaning of this Act.” Id. at 661 (quoting the Indian Act of Canada, R.S.C., ch. 98, § 
14 (1927)). 
 78. Marian L. Smith, The INS and the Singular Status of North American Indians, 21 AM. INDIAN 
CULTURE & RESEARCH J. 131, 147–48 (1997). 
 79. 380 F. Supp. 1210 (D. Me. 1974). 
 80. For greater discussion of immigrant groups and notions of permissible citizenships, see Mae M. 
Ngai, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF AMERICA (2004). For a 
treatment of the experience of indigeneity at the border, see Smith, supra note 78, at 146–49 (providing 
a more nuanced account of the interpretive tensions between political forms of recognition at the 
border and more racialized interpretations between 1928 and 1952). 
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The racialization of Indian identity in the United States correlates to the 
differing conceptions of Indian relationships to the state and to Indian 
citizenship through time. These were conceptions of recognition that moved 
Indian tribes away from the semisovereign status of “domestic and dependent 
nations” and into the conceptual and legal ambit of racialized minorities. Much 
like the East Indians who immigrated to Canada,81 Indians in the United States 
and Canada appear completely outside of the frame of U.S. citizenship, from 
which the U.S. Constitution excluded them by virtue of their perceived 
incapacity for civilization and taxability.82 However, unlike the East Indians in 
Canada, indigenous peoples within the United States were not geographically 
distant people, or foreign people who represented reprehensible or anxiety-
provoking cultural differences to the American or Canadian legal eye; they 
were, from their earliest moments of interaction, recognized and indigenous 
sovereigns, not foreigners seeking to immigrate, nor citizens. 
This initial exclusion, which was based on the semisovereign status, or 
“independent” status of Indians and the taxable standard of citizenship, was in 
contrast to the deliberate exclusion of African Americans and Asian Americans 
in that it was not yet based on racialized criteria.83 However this nonracialized 
standard of difference and recognition for Indians would soon change.84 Since 
Indian exemption from the more racialized ambits of exclusion was most likely 
in reference to their “nontaxable status” within the geographical parameters of 
the United States as people possessing membership within internal nations, the 
diminution of their separate status—and concomitant political authority and 
recognition—was directly related to the application of more racialized forms of 
recognition and to U.S. citizenship. 
This diminution began with the Dawes Severalty Act of 1887, which granted 
U.S. citizenship to Indians who rescinded their tribal membership and their 
aboriginal rights to land and who accepted the apportioning of their land into 
fee-simple plots.85 During this important transitory period, tribal membership 
was maintained as important, but in the space of “neither this nor that,” or 
between the legal categories of citizen and ward in the courts: 
 
 81. For a greater treatment of this subject, see generally Radhika Vyas Mongia Race, Nationality, 
Mobility: A History of the Passport, 11 PUB. CULTURE 527, 527–56 (1999). 
 82. See Smith, supra note 78, at 133. 
 83. Id. at 135. 
 84. Id. at 136. 
 85. The Dawes Severalty Act of 1887 is much more complicated than the above sentence indicates. 
Converting from communal forms of ownership (or stewardship) to individual forms of property 
required much more than a shift in territorial boundaries. The Dawes Severalty Act served to 
consolidate State power through its expropriation of massive amounts of land and the apportioning of 
land, based on Western notions of private property, appropriate ownership, and land tenure. The 
Dawes Severalty Act also instituted an astonishing twenty-five-year wait for allotees to qualify for 
ownership while they were required to pay rent on their land. After that time, they finally owned their 
land, or “qualified,” according to the civility standards of the local Indian agent, for the actual 
ownership of their land. 
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In the 188586 case Elk vs. Wilkins, the Supreme Court maintained the opinion that 
American Indians were born into allegiance to their tribe and therefore were not U.S. 
citizens. The court reinforced this position in the 1898 U.S. vs. Wong Kim Ark opinion, 
adding that though Indians born in the United States were subject to the United 
States, they were not born into allegiance to the nation and could not be considered 
U.S. citizens. This decision rendered American Indians not only non-citizens within 
the United States, but also, being subject to United States jurisdiction, rendered them 
non-aliens as well.87 
Citizenship is, in this rendering, a political identity rather than a racial one, 
and, as such, Indians were citizens only in geographic “spots.”88 More racialized 
forms of recognition began in part with Mosier v. United States,89 which 
acknowledged blood to be the proper form of identification for Indians.90 This 
passage regarding the illegal sale of liquor to the Osage Hazel Gray evinces the 
ways in which citizenship, guardianship, and tribal membership are worked out 
in legal reasoning. In this formulation, blood, or race, is ascendant. 
The question, then, to be decided on this branch of the case is: Does the mere fact of 
citizenship destroy the allegation of the indictment that Hazel Gray was on December 
28, 1909, an Osage Indian under the charge of an Indian superintendent, and an Indian 
over whom the government, through the Interior Department, exercised 
guardianship? There is certainly nothing inconsistent in being an Indian and a citizen 
of the United States at the same time. The word “Indian” describes a person of Indian 
blood. The word “citizen” describes a political status. If as a matter of law and fact the 
government is exercising guardianship over an Indian who is also a citizen, it is not for 
the courts to say when the guardianship shall cease.91 
In this decision, blood took precedence over other forms of recognition that 
were at work—and at work simultaneously—in the United States at this time: 
wardship, citizenship, tribal membership, and, during the twenty-five-year 
waiting period mentioned above, allotment and aptitude.92 The American 
recognition of blood or quantifiable notions of race (or difference) was not 
completely consistent with Canadian forms of recognition, but was consistent 
 
 86. This was two years before the Dawes Severalty Act. 
 87. See Smith, supra note 78, at 134. 
 88. In the United States, there is no overarching form of policy regarding membership in an Indian 
tribe or nation, as in Canada. The process of determining membership occurs through the 
implementation of the Dawes Severalty Act, which first created membership lists for the allotment of 
land and did so according to the subjective tests of civility and, at times, the astonishing physical 
anthropology administered by Indian Agents or anthropologists, who allotted Indians land based on 
their reading of Native peoples’ bodily characteristics. These characteristics—curly hair, big feet, 
straight hair, et cetera—were read as indexes of racial purity and thus, cultural purity. The purer a 
person was in indigenous culture, the more likely he was to be deemed less competent and less able to 
hold land in private ownership. David L. Beaulieu, Curly Hair and Big Feet: Physical Anthropology and 
the Implementation of Land Allotment on the White Earth Chippewa Reservation, 8 AM. INDIAN 
QUART. 281, 281–314 (1984). 
 89. 198 F. 54 (8th Cir. 1912). 
 90. Id. at 57. 
 91. Id. 
 92. During this qualifying period for allotment, individuals were assessed for their degree of 
aptitude and other evidence of civilization and “waited” for their certificates of competency and thus 
their possession of land. The recognition of blood over other identifying and recognizable criteria 
would be affirmed in the Citizenship Act of 1924, the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, and then in 
the the INS immigration policy of 1952. 
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with the racialization of identity that had long been occurring in the United 
States through the legacy of slavery and through the courts. 
The landscape in Canada was, and still is, different than that in the United 
States; but in some respects, it is quite similar. Unlike the racialized 
interpretation of crossing in the United States, Canada would take an extreme 
culturalist position in interpreting the Jay Treaty.93 When Akwesasne Grand 
Chief Mike Mitchell tested Jay Treaty going “the other way”—from the United 
States to Canada—to renew trade relations with the Mohawk reserve 
community of Tyendinaga, his rights to trade within Mohawk territory were not 
respected. In his trial, archaeological evidence was used to deny the Mohawk 
claim to an aboriginal right to travel and to trade with other Mohawks and 
trade north of the St. Lawrence River. Based on the culture test laid out in Van 
der Peet, this trade north of the St. Lawrence was deemed not to be a significant 
part of Mohawk culture and thus not a right to be upheld by the Supreme Court 
of Canada: 
In Mitchell, . . .the Supreme Court insisted on the idea that, in order to found a right, a 
practice does not have to be absolutely unchanging over time: it is allowed to have 
changed so as to remain relevant to its time, but it must demonstrate a definite 
continuity. . . . In Mitchell, however, the border marked by the Saint-Lawrence River 
is absolute: while changes to the way trade is carried out are permitted, the Court 
explicitly refuses to apply the same dynamic reasoning with regard to the territory on 
which such trade takes place.94 
These different interpretations regarding boundaries and territory are part 
of an interpretive process in Canada of using especially static and culturalist 
methodology to mete out recognition. Culture is allowed to change, but 
elements within in it must maintain the same value and meaning through time. 
The practice must remain evident to the juridical eye and to the expert eyes of 
archaeologists, historians, and anthropologists, and it must be evident through 
time. This expert juridical frame for recognizing rights to territory has real 
implications, as well, for the ways in which Indians born in Canada exercise 
 
 93. This extreme culturalist position was laid out in Canadian law in 2001. Mitchell v. M.N.R., 1 
S.C.R. 911 (2001). The legal strategy of Akwesasne had moved from a Treaty-rights argument to an 
aboriginal-rights argument. The Treaty-rights approach failed with Francis v. The Queen, S.C.C. (1956), 
which denied Jay Treaty rights to the Akwesasne Mohawk Lewis Francis, who was transporting 
consumer goods from the United States to Canada for his own use. The court denied Francis’ Treaty 
rights, reasoning that Britain, not Canada, was a signatory to the Jay Treaty. In a 1988 test case, Mike 
Mitchell brought goods from the United States’ side of the border into Canada, for delivery to the 
Mohawk community of Tyendinaga, northwest of Akwesasne. He was charged with violating the 
Customs Act by not paying a duty. The appellate court upheld his Jay Treaty rights. However, by the 
time the case got to the Supreme Court of Canada in 2001, the arguments were no longer about the 
Treaty, but about aboriginal rights to trade, generally, because Mitchell’s act was framed as the exercise 
of his traditional and cultural right to trade within the territory belonging to Mohawks. This argument 
accorded with the definition of aboriginal rights laid out in the Constitution Act of Canada, which 
affirms “existing aboriginal treaty rights of Canada.”  The argument also fleshed with aboriginal rights 
as defined in R. v. Van der Peet, 2 S.C.R 507 (1996). There they are considered cultural rights, which are 
defined as such because they are tied to cultural practices that were in play prior to settler occupancy. 
 94. Claude Denis, Indigenous Citizenship and History in Canada: Between Denial and Imposition, 
in CONTESTING CANADIAN CITIZENSHIP: HISTORICAL READINGS 113, 123 (Robert Adamoski et al., 
eds. 2002). 
SIMPSON__BOOK PROOF_FINAL.DOC 10/27/2008  7:57:45 AM 
Summer 2008] SUBJECTS OF SOVEREIGNTY 211 
their rights to cross back to Canada and to conduct more contemporary forms 
of trade. It is a constant form of contention between Iroquois and all settler 
regimes that they encounter. 
VII 
THE REVENUE RULE AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY 
R.J. Reynolds treated RICO-suit taxation as a reflection of state 
sovereignty; hence the revenue rule was treated as a universal rule of law that, 
absent a specific treaty, would defer to another state’s sovereignty (or extend 
the other state’s sovereignty beyond its territorial limits). That is, nation-states 
do not collect taxes for other nation-states, because to do so is to impede the 
sovereignty of the other state and to diminish one’s own jurisdiction over 
territory. Once R.J. Reynolds was filed, it became a conflict-of-laws issue 
because the court needed to determine which nation’s law would be applied to 
the dispute—U.S. or Canadian law—whose jurisdiction would be upheld, and 
which body politic had suffered harm. Thus, the question was also whether the 
revenue rule applied to one nation-state’s trading activities in the territory of 
another. In this case of “smuggling,” the injury of lost revenue was to the 
national economy of Canada. Thus, this case had “extraterritorial” dimensions, 
because although the harm was to Canada, the injury had been committed 
elsewhere. 
The visibility of Indian governmental bodies through the form of arrests and 
through the nationally televised documentaries of Troubled Waters, in 1993, and 
The Dark Side of Native Sovereignty, in 1996, served as spectacles that would 
obscure the larger modes of production and exchange at work. These larger 
machinations were tobacco conglomerates willfully circumventing the law in 
order to derive surplus from the sale of untaxed cigarettes. The lost revenue 
and associated law-enforcement costs then traversed the boundaries of 
provinces, states, and then nation-states, begging the question of whose law 
applied. These are issues that begin with the territorial premise of sovereignty 
as dominion over a place and people, but that, more specifically in this case, are 
applied extraterritorially through the form of revenue and in particular, the 
revenue rule. 
Although the revenue rule stated “that one sovereign will not enforce the 
tax judgments or claims of another sovereign,”95 the problem was not cast in 
these terms because the problem, in the early and mid-1990s in Canada, became 
something else through the focus on Indians as the visible smugglers. The role 
of Big Tobacco was yet to be revealed and remained invisible, unnoticeable in 
the earliest public scrutiny of tobacco smuggling. Iroquois nationals and, in 
particular, Mohawks—and their sovereignty—were, by contrast, very visible. 
 
 95. Attorney Gen. of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 106 (2002) 
(overruled on other grounds). 
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Consider here the Canadian Border Service Agency’s summary of the 
events leading up to R.J. Reynolds: 
While Canada knew that smuggling was occurring along its borders, it was not aware 
of Defendants’ [Big Tobacco’s] participation in smuggling. Canada recognized the 
devastating impact upon Canadian society and the integrity of the Canadian 
regulatory framework. Thus, Canada augmented efforts to control tobacco smuggling 
and embarked upon an almost decade-long effort to eliminate the growing smuggling 
problem.96 
Perhaps because of an unawareness of the corporate defendants’ position, 
the “smuggling problem” in an earlier iteration was conflated with 
indigenousness, and indigenousness with Mohawks. Mohawks were then 
equated with lawlessness, and lawlessness with indigenous sovereignty. 
Indigenous sovereignty carried the residue of savagery. As Aristotle and 
others who have relied upon his reasoning have argued, savagery is a condition 
of beast-like association that is defined as being without law.97 As the discussion 
and analysis of public texts on smuggling illustrated, it was Mohawk invocations 
of sovereignty and the practice of sovereignty through their exercising of the Jay 
Treaty right to cross that made their move toward “savagery” and “lawlessness” 
possible in the public mind. This representational chain of equivalencies and 
conflations reduced sovereignty to aboriginality and in this, to racialized and 
temporalized bodies and locales. These bodies were reduced to entities that 
were legally confounding and spectacular; the entities became newsworthy in 
their failure to conform to economic norms and to consent to citizenry by 
conforming to taxation regimes. 
To be taxed is to be a citizen;98 to evade this is to be a savage, improper, or 
lawless citizen. The publicizing of this “lawlessness,” as with the nationally 
televised documentaries discussed above, incited national anxieties and 
fiduciary norms around taxation that then took the shape of public concern. 
However, to be an indigenous person in Canada is also to occupy a different 
space for citizenship, one that from its inception “evades” taxation because of 
the legally defined status of “wardship” that recognized Indians occupy. This 
legal status has been called “citizens plus” in liberal policy,99 a naming that 
sought to capture the perceived duality of their legal category: they were 
citizens of a “first nation” (the aboriginal one) and also citizens of the nation-
state that now frames that first nation (the settler society). This policy did not 
 
 96. News Release, Canada Border Services Agency, Case Summary: Attorney Gen. of Canada v. 
R.J. Reynolds et al. (1999) (on file with author). 
 97. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 11 (Ernest Baker trans., Oxford Univ. P. 1995) (“Man, when 
perfected, is the best of animals; but if he be isolated from law and justice he is the worst of all.”). 
 98. Ensin F. Isin & Bryan S. Turner, Investigating Citizenship: An Agenda For Citizenship Studies, 
11 CITIZENSHIP STUDS. 5, 5 (2007). 
 99. This was first coined in the Hawthorn Report in Canada in 1966. A SURVEY OF THE 
CONTEMPORARY INDIANS OF CANADA: A REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, EDUCATIONAL 
NEEDS AND POLICIES 13 (H. B. Hawthorn, ed. 1966), available at http://www.ainc-
inac.gc.ca/pr/pub/srvy/sci3_e.html (last visited May 29, 2008) (“Indians should be regarded as ‘citizens 
plus;’ in addition to the normal rights and duties of citizenship, Indians possess certain additional rights 
as charter members of the Canadian community.”). 
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take into account the way the category of “citizens plus” also signified to 
Indians an executive or settler fiat: the recognition, in Hegelian terms, was a 
one-sided recognition, a legal event ensconced in time and in law that signaled 
the descent of their ability to be recognized as Indians and the strangulation of 
their governmental systems. Indigenous governmental systems were not 
recognized; what was recognized was the differentiation of those systems 
according to criteria defined by first Britain, and then Canada. 
The conservative Canadian think tank The Mackenzie Institute examined 
the issue of cigarette smuggling. Its researchers derived their concern over 
cigarette smuggling from these histories of spatial and legal containment of 
Indians. They asked questions and sought to find their own answers, answers 
that lay within indigenousness itself, particularly within Iroquois 
indigenousness, as the main Indian protagonists in this issue who possessed 
special rights guaranteed to them as a border tribe exercising distinct aboriginal 
(cultural) and treaty rights100 Of this issue the Mackenzie Institute wrote, 
While smoking for pleasure was practiced by other Natives and Europeans, this would 
have been seen by many [eighteenth-c]entury members of [the] Confederacy as 
vaguely sacrilegious. Leaf tobacco is still used for traditional purposes. When the Jay 
Treaty was signed in 1794 to allow Natives to bring goods across the border without 
paying taxes, king size, filter-tipped menthol flavoured cigarettes were a long way off. 
The MacKenzie researchers’ questions and answers animated a volley of 
conflations and representations and added to the anxieties in Canada about the 
sincerity of indigenous culture, about the North American Free Trade 
Agreement—taken together, these seemed to induce a panic. Anthropologist 
Elizabeth Povinelli attributes the panic to the temporal precariousness of settler 
nations, the demands that the politics of recognition place upon settlers and 
indigenous peoples vis-à-vis the history and the courts.101 Although she does not 
note that precariousness is also the work of settler sovereignty, she warns that 
the panic signaled the potential for that sovereignty to be undone. 
VIII 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE INDIGENOUS SMUGGLING CRISIS 
So, in the context of one settler society—Canada—indigenous trade 
practice, predicated upon indigenous historical and legal experiences in 
territories the Canadians claim as their own, became “smuggling,” and 
smuggling had to be contained immediately through representational practice, 
such as the media, but representational practice that mirrored the law. What the 
media images did was remove “sovereignty” from the domain of the currently 
conventional sovereign, from the boundaries of the nation-state in which the 
 
 100. For an example of a perspective that is skeptical of aboriginal claims to tobacco trade, see John 
Thompson, Sin Tax Failure: The Market in Contraband Tobacco and Public Safety (2006), available at 
http://www.mackenzieinstitute.com/1994/sin-tax-failure4.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2008). 
 101. ELIZABETH A. POVINELLI, THE CUNNING OF RECOGNITION: INDIGENOUS ALTERITIES AND 
THE MAKING OF AUSTRALIAN MULTICULTURALISM 2–4 (2002). 
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practice of smuggling presumably occurred, and conflated it with aboriginality, 
and with indigeneity, in the public eye. Thus, sovereignty appeared not to 
belong to the state, but to belong instead to those who worked within and 
through settler-state borders through criminalized trade. The sovereignty of the 
nation-state under which such trading practices occurred is never discussed 
explicitly, for to do so would reveal its fragility. Focusing upon indigenous trade 
practices, however, reveals that fragility; but these trade practices must be 
stripped of their historical place and criminalized, so as not to reveal the 
temporal dimension of conquest. 
To speak of indigenousness is to speak of aboriginality, a form of 
(recognizable) identity that is predicated upon a temporal relationship to land 
and to others. The benchmarks and tests of aboriginality reside, however, not in 
the self-designation of the indigenous group or in its own legal histories or 
mappings, but in the settler state itself, structured always though the frame of 
settler law. Thus, to speak of aboriginality is to speak comparatively, a logos 
that might go something like this: “If this is aboriginal, then this is not.” The 
difference is a certain relationship to time,102 and to articulate this logos, at any 
moment, is to run the risk of revealing the comparative youth and fragility of 
settler nation-states. This youth and fragility is dealt with in law and managed 
through decisions on indigeneity, and this sustains the settlers’ condition of 
being, because to live fully aware of the youth and fragility of settler nation-
status might very well incite a moral panic. This panic could be the “crisis in 
reason” that Povinelli documents and theorizes from, a space fraught with 
impasses that this consciousness produces.103 If the law is not upheld and 
maintained, then chaos will, or might, ensue. So, order requires that the 
modalities and practices of indigenousness “trade” or “commerce” be conflated 
with “smuggling” and that Indian recognition be closely regulated so that the 
temporality and justness of their claims are adjudicated not by Indians, but by 
those who now occupy their space. Law is the primary means through which 
that process occurs and, in law, settler colonialism maintains itself. 
Events leading up to R.J. Reynolds were sieved through media 
representations that fomented this anxiety and fear of uncontainment. The 
images of criminal “warriors” were set side by side with contraband cigarettes, 
cigarettes that were contraband because they eluded being taxed, they were not 
providing revenue for Canada, and, as such, they were themselves the 
synecdoche for unsettling settlement, the unbounding of the place of Canada, as 
Canada itself—a claim of property, of seizure through law and citizenship 
without consent. Indigenous trade and traffic in cigarettes thus agitated the 
 
 102. See, e.g., R. v. Van der Peet, 2 S.C.R. 507 para. 47 (1996) (proffering a test for identifying 
aboriginal rights: “in order to be an aboriginal right an activity must be an element of a practice, custom 
or tradition integral to the distinctive culture of the aboriginal group asserting the right,” and then the 
court determines whether that right is tied to distinctive cultural practices that were defined prior to 
contact). 
 103. ELIZABETH A. POVINELLI, THE CUNNING OF RECOGNITION: INDIGENOUS ALTERITIES AND 
THE MAKING OF AUSTRALIAN MULTICULTURALISM 33 (2002). 
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foundation of nation-state formation as a form of property, the indigenous’ 
actions, which the Iroquois argued were an exercise of their sovereign right to 
trade in their territories, questioned not only the claiming of a settler state, but 
of citizenship itself. The exercise of their own sovereignty then revealed the 
fragility of the sovereign status of the settler state, which had never achieved a 
proper or robust form of consent from the indigenous political subjects 
themselves, who refused to act as subjects and be contained, or to be taxed. 
IX 
CONCLUSION 
The representational history of Indian “lawlessness” does not have its 
beginning with cigarette “smuggling” in the 1990s. Its genealogy extends back 
to the earliest moments of recorded encounter, when Indians appeared to have 
no law, to be without order, and thus, to be, in the colonizer’s most generous 
articulation of differentiation, in need of the trappings of civilization. “Law” 
may be one instrument of civilization, as a regulating technique of power that 
develops through the work upon a political body and a territory. Designating 
“savagery” was required for the forceful imposition of law, as was designating 
brutishness. So the law in Canada—and to a less-focused and less-encompassing 
extent, that in the United States—has attempted to define and regulate Indian 
behavior, to protect, and, in different iterations, to confine and contain the 
indigenous in certain spaces. The 1876 Canadian Indian Act, when compared to 
the 2,500 pieces of legislation that comprise the rubric of federal Indian law in 
the United States, is a uniform body of law that has sought to do all of the 
above. It is very much about achieving a state of lawfulness and containment, 
which is an ontological state of political subject-hood that is highly regulatory 
and does significant legal work upon the territories, bodies, and cultures of 
Indians in Canada. Its structuring presupposition is that Indians reside 
somewhere between ward, citizen, and people presumed to be savage who must 
have their savagery recognized first, in order to be governed. R.J. Reynolds and 
related decisions revealed the ways in which law regarding Indians was a failed 
episode of consent, consent to a form of sovereignty that is clear and that 
unambiguously accords with territories of conquest. It also fails to regulate fears 
of lawlessness while uncovering the role that “indigenous savagery” has had in 
furthering settler capitalism. Finally, it diminishes indigenous rights to trade and 
to act as sovereigns in their own territories. 
